Joseph J. Mauro
This essay will argue that Cato the Younger’s constant and unbending opposition to The First Triumvirate, specifically Pompey, caused the Roman democracy to crumble and Caesar to emerge as dictator. First, I will examine how Cato’s unnatural abhorrence for Caesar obscured rational political debate, which would have been vital in sustaining a democratic republic. Second, I will discuss the consequences of Cato’s irrational fear that Pompey and his troops would rise against the Republic and seize power; for Cato’s unwavering resistance to the reasonable requests made by Pompey compelled that general to federate with Caesar. Finally, I will discuss the result of the destructive tactics that Cato used in the Senate to deny a request from the tax collecting Knights in the East, who were supported by the very wealthy and influential Crassus, to renegotiate their contract after they had realized that they made a grievous error in calculating their profits. Also, it is important to explore the original feelings Crassus had for Pompey and how the actions of the Senate tempered that sentiment.
Before examining these areas, though, I feel it is important to acknowledge the very favorable account of Cato given by Plutarch. I could hardly find another author who shared his conviction that Cato’s efforts, while a member of the Senate, were always helpful to democracy. By canvassing Plutarch’s life, we will gain perspective, however, behind his obvious omission of Cato’s real anti-democratic practices.
Plutarch was born in Greece and lived his whole life in the small town of Chaeronea. He served as priest of the temple of Apollo and also held the office of mayor for a time, exposing his interest in political matters. At his estate in the country, Plutarch “presided” over large gatherings of wealthy citizens from across the Roman Empire. The purpose of these gatherings was to engage in serious political and philosophical discussions. Here, it is possible that Plutarch began to present an ideal of upper-class values. His essays and lectures were very popular amongst the elite and members of the Roman government, specifically Statesman Socius Senecio who influenced the emperor to make copies of Plutarch’s work. In the midst of all that political influence, it would not have been in Plutarch’s best interest to criticize former Roman Statesmen if he wished to continue having his writings distributed throughout the Roman Empire. It is also significant to mention that Plutarch thought of himself as a philosopher rather than a historian and saw history as a moral theater that could be a lesson for a more virtuous life.1 During this time in Rome, there was a large demand for moral guidance. The depravity and decadence of the Roman culture had seemed to wear thin on her citizens and they yearned to lead a more exemplary life. In the Parallel Lives, Plutarch appealed to this need and offered a perspective with moral implications.
First, let’s begin by examining the unnatural abhorrence Cato had for Caesar. The origin of these feelings are unknown but one could speculate that possibly it was the very nature of Cato, virtuous and self-sacrificing, which was in stark contrast to the more devious and expedient nature of Caesar. Cato, for example, while traveling throughout the Roman Empire, would never ride horseback or wear sandals, choosing to walk barefoot among the soldiers or the so-called “common man.” His convictions were rooted in a time that had long since past, when the leadership in Rome was more concerned about integrity, sustaining the democracy, and manifesting the strength of Rome throughout the known world. From his early childhood, Cato demonstrated his loyalty to Rome and his passion for democracy and seldom, if ever, compromised. As head of the treasury, he discovered blatant corruption throughout the office: debts that were never paid and credits that were never collected. Instead of ignoring or engaging in the corruption, Cato restored the office to its original integrity and began to acquire respect and admiration from many members of the Senate, including Cicero. This fact alone might have sparked an animosity that Caesar had toward Cato because of the deep respect Caesar had for Cicero and his desire for the orator’s acceptance.3 But Caesar’s disposition was contrary to the ideals of Cicero and Cato. Caesar desired, above all, to be the ultimate authority in the Roman Empire and to be feared and admired by all the Roman citizens, showing his propensity toward what was popular rather than what was just.4 Caesar, however, was a great leader and did much to fill the coffers and pockets of the aristocracy while expanding the Roman Empire. His heroic efforts while in battle are well documented and it must be acknowledged that these endeavors did much to strengthen Rome’s position throughout the world. Yet, despite this, Cato felt it necessary to vehemently oppose any request made by Caesar or his allies no matter how reasonable they seemed. When Caesar returned from Spain in 60 BC, for example, he requested, as was his right, a triumph as well as permission to run for the consulship. While Caesar waited outside the city walls (as was the custom for all Generals returning victorious) for an answer from the Senate, Cato began a long, convoluted speech that did nothing but obstruct Caesar’s request. What was more significant were the measures the Senate took to further estrange Caesar from the democratic process. Knowing that Caesar would win the office, Cato and the Senate bribed Calpurnius Bibulus, an ardent adversary of Caesar’s, to stand as his associate. It is important to mention that the “incorruptible” Cato supported and initiated this measure stating that it “was for the public good.” The Senate, certain that Caesar would win, selected inauspicious provinces for the prospective office winners—provinces which were formerly forests and cattle-drifts. By doing this, the Senate conspired to ruin Caesar financially by denying him the opportunity to repay his financial obligations. But nonetheless, Caesar was at the pinnacle of political influence, and the Senate’s endeavors to destroy him politically did nothing but encourage Caesar’s anti-aristocratic sentiment.
Prior to the elections of 60 BC, there arose a call for revolt from certain factions disappointed over recent decisions made by the Senate that favored the upper class; also, the consulship to Catiline was denied three times. The Catiline Conspiracy, as it is called, was a plan to overthrow the government, burn down the aqua-duct, and murder all the Senators. Through some fortunate events, the Senate learned of this conspiracy and called hearings to decide how to address the problem. The original intention was to have the conspirators put to death immediately. But Caesar, who would be later known for his clemency, urged the Senate to consider the precedent and how dangerous it would be to sentence these men to death without a fair trial, the founding principle that democracy is built around. However, Cato spoke out against the future Emperor, reviving the Senate’s thirst for blood with an impassioned speech that included accusations that would implicate Caesar as co-conspirator. Denying Caesar his right to a triumph, granting him useless land, and opposing every bill and request that he brought before the Senate can be perceived as a personal affront rather than a well considered resolution that would benefit the commonwealth. This shortsighted approach to government proved to be the catalyst that brought together the essential elements which would tear down the democracy.
Second, the most significant event that led to the eventual end of democracy in Rome was the irrational fear that Cato displayed over the possibility that General Pompey, on his return to Rome, would rise against the Republic and seize power. Less than twenty years earlier, General Sulla returned to Rome, and with his military might, he overthrew the government. Knowing that Pompey was a solider who served under him, Cato, as well as the Senate, had good reason to believe that the General would assert his military strength and take control of the city.
But Pompey did something rather unexpected for someone plotting to overthrow the government. He delayed his return to Rome for almost a year, and he relieved his soldiers of their duties. Also, upon his return from the East, Pompey deposited a large sum of money in the treasury. The tax revenues that were collected due to the annexations in the East were quite substantial. These acts alone should have persuaded the Senate to dismiss the idea of a siege and welcome Pompey back with the acknowledgment he deserved as a hero of Rome. However, the Senate, including Cato, refused to acknowledge the sacrifices the General had made and denied every request he brought before them. For example, when Pompey asked the Senate to provide land for some of his discharged soldiers, the request was denied because of the ardent opposition of Cato and other factions in the Senate; Pompey’s bill was rejected on the grounds that the treasury was empty. This, of course, was a lie and obviously portrayed deep resentment the Senate had for Pompey. According to Sir Charles Oman in Seven Roman Statesmen of the Later Republic, long before Pompey’s return from the East, the Senate conspired to ruin him politically and render him powerless. According to Oman, the Catiline Conspiracy was still fresh in everybody’s mind and Cicero went to great lengths to remind the Senate of the tremendous contribution he made on behalf of Rome.6 If the Senate began to recognize the efforts of the General, they would forget Cicero’s “heroic” endeavors to stifle the conspirators and save Rome from eminent destruction, and his popularity would falter. Another mistake made by the Senate was in failing to ratify the treaties Pompey made with the Princes of the Orient. This was simply an effort by the Senate and Cato to demean the General and to refuse this acta (the ratification of his actions in the East). This, as well as rejecting the request for land for his soldiers, gave Caesar an excellent opportunity to appeal to Pompey’s frustrations and persuade him to conspire with Caesar to overthrow the democracy.
Unlike the Senate, Caesar realized the benefits of aligning with the General. The vast fortune of Crassus, the popularity of Caesar, and the military strength of Pompey would have created a formidable force. But, without the land grants for his soldiers, this union would have been rendered impotent because Pompey would have lost the loyalty of his soldiers by not giving them what he had promised. So, when Caesar won the office of Consul, he surrounded the forum with Pompey’s soldiers and used force to throw out those, including Cato, who tried to oppose his request for both the land grants, the ratification of Pompey’s acta, as well as allowing him to marry his daughter. These acts formed the first Triumvirate and the beginning of the eventual fall of the democracy.
Finally, I want to discuss the results of the obstruction tactics Cato used to deny a request made by the tax collecting Knights in the East to renegotiate their contract. Apparently, the Knights had made a grievous error while calculating the profits they hoped to receive and tried to persuade the Senate to arrange a more favorable settlement. The Knights appealed to the very wealthy and influential Crassus to pressure the Senate into granting their petition. But Cato, seeing through this obvious misappropriation, urged the Senate to ignore the request, which they did. Although this saved the Republic from losing revenue, it caused Crassus to break from his initial decision to side with Cato and the Senate to block the requests of Pompey. This decision was based on a deep-seated animosity Crassus had for Pompey that was sparked when both of them fought under Sulla. Simply, Crassus was jealous of the success Pompey enjoyed, and with typical upper-class Roman envy, he sought to ally himself with the Senate to deny any request made by the General when he returned from the East.7 However, when the Senate rejected the pleas of Crassus to reconsider the contracts of the Knights, Caesar took advantage of the opportunity and entreated him to join the effort to undermine the Senate and take control of the Republic. By granting the Knights their request when he obtained the office of consul, Caesar secured an alliance that, along with the military strength of Pompey and the idolatry of the people, would prove to be a formidable opponent to democracy. Caesar was hard pressed to sway Crassus to league with Pompey, but the opposition of Cato and the Senate did much to alter his sentiment. The rebuff of Crassus by Cato was indeed in the best interest of the commonwealth, but as I have previously argued, the result of this opposition brought the essential pieces together that were needed to topple the democracy.
Throughout history there have been few men who could compare with Cato the Younger. He exemplified the ideal that one’s honor is more important than one’s own personal safety and he gained the respect and admiration of the people by simply doing what he felt was the right. While head of the treasury early in his career, Cato not only reestablished the integrity of the office by rooting out the elements of corruption but also secured the highest esteem from the Senate and the commonwealth that would precede him throughout his life. But Cato’s inability to compromise or consider the long term effects of his decisions made him responsible for the end of democracy in Rome. What other possible result could come from opposing such influential and powerful men like Caesar or Pompey or Crassus? How is it that Cato could not perceive the inevitable bitterness and resentment that would arise within Pompey after denying such reasonable requests? If Cato might have realized the benefits of a good relationship with the General and encouraged the Senate to acknowledge Pompey’s achievements and grant him his requests, Caesar would have lacked the strong military position needed to intimidate and threaten the Senate. The nature of democracy assures that every voice has a right to be heard and considered. It is obvious that Cato had a difficult time comprehending this very important expression of freedom and his shortsighted and antidemocratic decisions proved to be the catalyst that brought together the essential elements to end democracy in Rome.
Works Cited
Oman, Sir Charles. Seven Roman Statesmen of the Later Republic: The Gracchi, Sulla, Crassus, Cato, Pompey, Caesar. Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1971.
Plato. Symposium